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Abstract
We examine the validity of a new system of taxation called lot-
tery receipts in China theoretically and empirically. Tax collection
is difficult as the government difficultly monitors the actual economic
dealings. To bring out the private information on transaction known
only to a seller and a buyer, the government has set up a lottery receipt
system which has been tried out in many areas. If the net revenue from
a lottery receipt is invested in pure public goods, the lottery receipt
will been purchased even if the consumer has expected quasi-linear
utility. By issuing a lottery receipt, the government may prevent tax
evasion caused by conspiracies between consumers and firms and col-
lect tax effectively. Estimation is performed based on panel data for
different periods from a total of 37 districts in Beijing and Tianjin dur-
ing 1998-2003. The lottery receipt experiment has significantly raised
the business tax, the growths of business tax and total tax revenues.
JEL classification: H26, D81, D82
Keywords: tax evasion, business tax, lottery receipt experiment, random
trend (growth) model
1 Introduction
1.1 The Light and Shadow of China’s Economy
China’s economy has shifted to a market economy since 1978 to include
the rural contract work system and private companies. Stock markets and
special economic zones have been founded since the 1980s. In 1994, decen-
tralization separated local and central government, including the taxation
system.1 After the 1978 shift to a market economy, high growth (averagely
9.6%) has been realized for 1979-2004 period. In 2005, China experienced
9.9% economic growth, and it is expected to achieve over 9% growth in
2006. However, as shown in Fig. 1, the budget deficit has become a serious
concern. The central government has been a budget deficit since 1982, and
the ratio of budget deficit to public expenditure was at the peak of −15.7%
in 2000.
Moreover, the Gini’s coefficient which measures the degree of economic
inequality in China has shown a upward trend. The Gini’s coefficient was
0.21 in rural sector and 0.16 in urban sector in 1978, 0.31 in rural sector and
0.21 in urban sector in 1990, 0.37 in rural sector and 0.32 in urban sector in
2003. The nationwide Gini’s coefficient was 0.39 in 1995, 0.40 in 2000 and
0.47 in 2004. Clearly, the degree of economic inequality in China is growing
and has reached a dangerous line.
To sustain future economic growth and stability, these two significant
issues must be resolved. The implementation of an efficient and fair tax
1From Fig. 1, the ratio of public income to GDP has changed to be in an upward trend
since 1994, it may be caused by this decentralization.
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collection system might serve as an effective and reasonable means toward
solving China’s economic problems; however, at present the country lacks
such a tax collection system. Economists have warned of the seriousness of
the deficit and inequality issues in China. In February 2004, Shiller (2004)
provided six pieces of advice regarding the Chinese economy, and his first
recommendation was the creation of an effective taxation system. Similarly,
Krugman (2004) noted that “since there is almost no tax collection system
anyway, a possibility that the China government itself will go bankrupt is
not zero, either.”
1.2 Tax Evasion
Although the government understands the importance of tax collection, with
the lack of the technical and intellectual ability to create a tax collection
system, all the efforts would be a vein. To collect a business tax (similar
to a consumption tax, i.e., about five percent of total sales), income tax,
and wealth tax the government needs to obtain private and corporate fi-
nancial records of transactions, income, and wealth. However, unless the
government is willing to pay the significant cost of monitoring the economic
dealings and the collection process, such information will not materialize.
Owing to the asymmetry of information between government and taxpayer,
individuals might be tempted to underreport the amount of taxes due.
Woller (1999) points that China’s shirking tax burden is partly due to
nearly endemic levels of tax evasion. ‘So Taxing’ (1989) points that in 1989,
the tax authorities of Shanghai seized the books of 10,361 private business-
men and found that 8,953 of them had evaded tax. 86% of the 163,000
2
registered businessmen in Shanghai (3.2% of the city’s workforce) may have
evaded taxes, probably 100% of the unregistered ones did. According to Li
(1995), the tax evasion in China is estimated to have caused the government
a loss of around 100 billion Yuan a year.
Fisman and Wei (2004) examines the relationship in China between the
tariff schedule and the “evasion gap,” which is defined as the difference
between Hong Kong’s reported exports to China at the product level and
China’s reported imports from Hong Kong. They have found that a one-
percentage-point increase in the tax rate is associated with 3 percent increase
in evasion.
Due to so serious tax evasion in China, it is difficult for the government to
capture the real economic activity, thus there is a part of economy which can
not be counted into national accounting but become underground. Bajada
and Schneider (2005) find that the size of the underground economy in
average 1991-1995 and in average 2000-2001 in China are in 10.2% and
13.4% of the official GDP, respectively. Based on the first census ‘China
Economic Census 2004,’ China National Statistical Bureau adjusted the
national accounting during 1978-2004 in January 2006. For example, the
accounting on GDP and on the service industry was undervalued to a large
degree, 14.39% of and 13.33% of GDP in 2004, respectively.2
2The GDP was re-estimated based on the informaion including the number of nation-
wide employees. In 2004, the GDP was 15.99 trillion Yuan, but 2.3 trillion Yuan was
totally undervalued and of which 2.13 trillion Yuan was from the service industry.
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1.3 Lottery Receipt Experiment
For many years mainland China has also been wrestling with the issue of
capturing a fair tax base. The government first issued a guideline requiring
“an official receipt printed with public lottery number” (You Jiang Fa Piao,
in Chinese, hereafter we call it “lottery receipt”) as a means of organizing
tax collection. According to “The Act of China Taxation,” receipt is defined
as a certificate of the monetary transaction, is the primary proof for financial
accounting and a tax audit, and is managed with printing, issue, and storage
by the taxation bureau. The government incorporates a lottery ticket into
an official receipt, hence the lottery receipt is not only an official receipt
but also a public lottery ticket simultaneously. The system of requiring a
receipt with lottery transactions appeared in Taiwan in the 1960s, in order
to improve tax collection efficiency; Taiwan still uses this system today.
The mainland China central government first mentioned on March 4,
1989, that the experiments with lottery receipt would be held in some areas
so as to strengthen the tax collection.3 Discussion and preparation took ten
years prior to the launch of the experiment. On January 1, 1998, the new
receipt system came into effect in Haikou City, Hainan Province, which is
one of the most open cities in China. The central government evaluated the
system’s performance and has since increased the trial area incrementally
across the nation. According to the author’s May 2003 research using the
3See Note of Mainland China Government in 1989 for details. The original sentence
is written in Chinese, “State Council’s notice on the main points of economic reform
presented by State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System in 1989.” In this
notice, it is pointed that “to strengthen the private firms’ tax collection, the lottery receipt
system can be tried out in some cities.”
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search engine Google.com, by the end of 2002 there were over 80 big-city-
level local tax bureaus countrywide (out of approximately 662) where the
experiment is underway. In other words, 12 percent of local tax bureaus are
conducting the lottery receipt experiment (LRE hereafter, also see Appendix
A).4
Accompanying the LRE, the “Act of China Taxation” was revised, and
since May 1, 2001, the “New Act of China Taxation” has been enacted.
The detailed enforcement rules for the new act came into effect on October
15, 2002. A new 23rd article has since been added to the new act, which
provides that “the equipment which prevents tax evasion should be actively
installed.” Specifically, this “equipment which prevents tax evasion” is a
patented machine that issues an official receipt printed with a public lottery
number.5
The experiments were conducted in depth in three of China’s largest
cities: Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. In Beijing, one district (out of 18)
has been conducting the experiment since January 1, 2001; seven districts
since August 1, 2002; and the remaining 10 districts have been issuing lottery
receipts since October 1, 2002. At first, mainly service industries, such as
4By the end of 2002, only Beijing and Shanghai had been experimental areas at the
provincial or state level, according to data from the China Taxation Bureau. Information
regarding the experiments in other areas has not been reported yet as formal statistical
data. The figure in Appendix A was obtained from the news media. Because these are not
government statistics, caution is required when interpreting the information. Therefore,
this table approximates the state of the experiments throughout country.
5The inventor of the lottery receipt machine is Haiping DAI. He applied for a patent
on April 28, 1998, and the China Patent Bureau authenticated the patent on February
21, 2001. This machine can issue the receipt with a special number that is used for a
random drawing. The value written on the receipt is reported to the consumer, the firm,
and the tax bureau simultaneously. The consumer can use the lottery receipt and the
special number to investigate the status of the prize by telephone or via the Internet.
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food service businesses issued lottery receipts. However, in Shanghai, the
experiment began in October 1, 2002, and since January 1, 2003, it has
grown to include other service industries such as beauty salons and real
estate agencies. In Tianjin, Tanggu (one district of Tianjin) began the
experiment on January 1, 2003, and the other districts have started since
January 2004. Today, the scope of areas conducting the LRE has expanded
to many areas.
1.4 Contribution and Structure of this Paper
In this paper, we first analyze theoretically whether the new taxation system
in China is well run, then we empirically examine the effect of the new sys-
tem on tax collection using the “natural experiment” method based on panel
data consisting of experimental and non-experimental areas. We found that
the new system may work well, even if the consumer has quasi-linear pref-
erence and expected utility. In addition, we found that the lottery receipt
experiment has caused not only business tax revenues but also the growths
of business tax and total tax revenues to increase significantly.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents related liter-
ature the inovation in China. Section 3 performs a theoretical consideration.
Section 4 describes the data, the model, and the method of econometric es-
timation. Section 5 shows the results, and Section 6 discusses the policy
implications and concludes.
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2 Related Literature and Inovation
2.1 Related Literature on Tax Evasion
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) are pioneers in analyzing
that a risk-averse taxpayer choose an optimal unreported income to maxi-
mize the expected utility under the governmental auditing. Since then there
are enormous theoretical and empirical studies on tax evasion. Andreoni et
al. (1998) make a comprehensive survey of this literature. It has been theo-
retically found that the tax enforcement, auditing, tax rate, income level and
social norms etc. should have impacts on tax evasion. Chapter 2 of Cowell
(1990) makes a list for the empirical studies of the extent of tax evasion
and the black economy in nineteen major countries. Crane and Nourzad
(1994), O’Higgins (1989), and Alm et al. (1991) emprically examine the
determinants of income tax evasion in U.S., U.K, and Jamaica, respectively.
As pointed out by Ishi(1981), there is the issue of ‘kuroyon’ in Japan,
which refers to the fact that the capture rates of taxale income recorded for
salaried workers, farmers and the self-employed are about 90, 60, and 40
percent, respectively. The taxation issue is often a point of contention in
Japan and it has been studied for many years. In relation to the ‘kuroyon
issue,’ as discussed in Horioka and Sekita (2006), it has been hotly debated
in Japan whether a corporate enterprise tax system based on sales, salary,
etc., and a taxpayer numbering system should be introduced; however, this
argument does not progress easily.
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2.2 Inovation in China
Up to date, the researches on tax evasion has been focused on the effects of
governmental monitoring, punishment and consumer’s attributes on the tax
evaders. It is the first time that the LRE in China has been tried to give
the taxpayers’ incentive to voluntarily declare the tax base by not inflicting
punishment but giving a prize (public lottery) simultaneously. There still
have been neither theoretical nor empirical research on this new system.
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Purchase of Lottery
Morgan (2000) presentes a mechanism for financing public goods by means
of a taxable lottery for consumers with quasi-linear preferences. Morgan
(2000)’s mechanism is proved to be more efficient than a voluntary taxpayer
system in regard to raising funds for welfare improvement. Morgan and
Sefton (2000) further confirm this theory by experiments. Prior to these
studies, Friedman and Savage (1948) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
analyze lottery purchases; however they do not consider the issue of produc-
ing an official receipt with lottery as a way to track business tax.
3.2 Tax Declaration by Lottery Receipt
3.2.1 Tax Evasion due to Too High Monitoring Cost
In an economic transaction (without lottery), it is assumed that there are
three types of agent: the firm, the consumer, and the government. The gov-
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ernment does want to know the transaction volume between the firm and
the consumer to collect the business (sales) tax. It is assumed that there are
infinite homogeneous firms, and that these firms seek profit maximization
within a competitive market. It is also assumed that there is a sufficiently
large and homogeneous body of consumers. When a consumer buys a prod-
uct from a firm, the information on the purchased quantity “v” is shared
with the company. The government cannot know about this sale unless it
applies a sufficiently large monitoring cost. Although social public welfare
will increase if all consumers pay their taxes voluntarily to produce optimal
public goods, the consumer has an incentive not to pay taxes (free rider
incentive) because the government cannot supervise the trading volume be-
tween the consumer and the firm. It is assumed that the government collects,
to the highest extent, sales tax “x” according to the purchased amount “v”
(here the rate of business (sales) tax is “x/v”), but that it cannot perform
proper accounting unless it has correct information regarding the correct
amount of “v.” However, the cost of monitoring “v” is larger than the tax
revenues “x” and the information value of “v.”6 Therefore, the government
will not act as the monitor of “v” and cannot fully collect the tax “x.”
3.2.2 Issuing and Purchase of Lottery Receipt
From the above section we know that the government’s net tax revenue will
be zero if the monitor cost is larger than the tax “x.” Therefore, when
building a tax collection system, a government must try to make taxpay-
6The information value of “v” here means that the correct value of “v” is essential to
the national accounting.
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ers cooperate in providing accurate financial information and must try to
design and provide an incentive mechanism that can mitigate information
asymmetry. Here, the government is assumed to issue a lottery receipt to
gather the information on sales.7
Something like money or currency, the lottery receipt cannot be forged.
When a consumer obtains a lottery receipt printed with the purchased
amount “v,” this receipt with “v” is copied into the government (to get
receipt means that the consumer declares the volume “v” and the tax “x”),
thus the government receives the verifiable fact of “v” and can collect the
tax “x.” Consumers have probability of getting lottery prize from the gov-
ernment if they are in possession of the lottery receipt. The lottery receipt
is essentially a public lottery, but it has some differences from regular public
lottery. First, it is printed on an offical receipt. Second, its price is the
sales tax “x.” Fig. 2 shows the framework of the delivery of lottery receipts
among the government, the firm, and the consumer.
Accordingly, we can transfer the consumers’ purchase problem of a lot-
tery receipt into a purchase problem of pure public lottery. We analyze the
consumers’ purchase of lottery tickets using Morgan (2000)’s framework.8
In this framework, the government sells fixed-prize raffle tickets (the prize
amount is “R”) and informs each consumer of “R” in advance. Consumer
i has wealth wi and quasi-linear preference. There are N consumers in this
7In reality, the goverment mornitors the tax evaters at the same time, issues lottery
receipt. For simplicity without lossing generality, it is assumed that the government does
not make monitoring. Another reason for this assumption is that there are not any data
on the governmental monitoring in the empirical analysis.
8The author also analyzed the purchase of public lottery in the framework of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Guiggin (1991) and found the second order condition for the
optimal lottery for government. The detailed results are available upon request.
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economy. Consumer i optimally chooses the amount to purchase xi ∈ [0, wi],
conditional on the fact that the purchases of other consumers are given. The
probability of winning the prize is set to xi/x(N) (x(N) = x1+...+xN ). The
net revenues to the government for offering pure public goods is G=x(N)-R.
The sales x(N) of the lottery are assumed to be large enough to cover the
prize R. The problem of lottery purchase for consumer i can be set as the
following expected utility maximization:
EUi = wi − xi + [xi/x(N)]R + hi[x(N)−R], (1)
where hi is consumer i’s utility from pure public goods. The first order
condition with respect to xi is
[xi/((x(N))2]R− 1 + h′i[x(N)−R] ≤ 0. (2)
In equilibrium, N’ consumers will purchase the amount (x∗i , ..., x
∗
N ′) of lot-
tery tickets, respectively. If the first order conditions of N’ consumers are
added, we get
N ′∑
i=1
h′i[x
∗(N ′)−R]−N ′ + (N ′ − 1)[R/x∗(N ′)] = 0. (3)
When the prize R is increased, the effect of prize R on the lottery sales x∗
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and on the net government revenues, respectively,9 are
∂x∗(N ′)
∂R
≥ 1, (4)
∂G
∂R
=
∂x∗(N ′)
∂R
− 1 ≥ 0, (5)
with strict inequality provided N ′ >1. As shown in equations (4) and (5),
increasing the prize does not reduce the sales x∗ and the governmental net
revenue G, but it is unclear here whether the prize definitely increases G.
Hence, it is necessary to clarify this property empirically.
We can consider that R=0 in areas where the LRE is not being con-
ducted; thus Equation (5) can express the difference in tax revenues between
areas where the experiment is and is not being conducted. Moreover, com-
parison within the areas of the experiment is also possible, and according to
Equation (5), the tax revenue in areas of the experiment with large prizes
is likely to be larger than (or equal to) that in areas of the experiment with
lower prizes. Sections 4 and 5 examine the effect of the lottery receipts, in
other words, whether ∂G∂R ≥ 0 is true.
4 Empirical Examinations
4.1 Probability of Winning a Prize, Amount of Prize
To announce the amount of the prize beforehand can be considered a strat-
egy of the government. For example, according to the pre-draw prize an-
nouncement by the Beijing Local Tax Bureau on July 17, 2002,10 total prize
9See Morgan (2000) for details.
10See “Beijing Evening on July 17, 2002” for details.
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money amounted to three million Yuan in August and September, and 10
million Yuan between August and December in 2002. However, ex post
facto, the total prize money paid out to the 67,129 winners in the whole
city during 2002 was 1.67 million Yuan. The total actual prize was therefore
only 16.7 percent of the announced prize.11 Moreover, the pre-drawing prize
announcement of the probability of winning the prize (namely, the ratio be-
tween the prize and the tax revenue) may be a strategy of the government.
According to a report of the China Taxation Bureau on July 30, 2002,12
the total prize amount paid out in all of the experimental areas throughout
China was 30 million Yuan, and the increase in tax revenues brought about
by the lottery receipts was 900 million Yuan between January 1 and June
30, 2002. The ratio of the prize to tax revenues (which can be seen as a kind
of input output ratio) was about 1:30. In the experiment in the Huairou
District of Beijing in 2001, 0.14 million Yuan was paid out in prizes and the
tax revenue of six million Yuan was increased owing to providing a receipt
with lottery purchases. The prize tax revenue ratio was about 1:40. Many
Chinese mass media outlets announce information regarding the prizes. We
cannot obtain detailed information on prizes at the provincial or state level
for the entire country, thus we cannot perform an econometric analysis at
the provincial level.
There are 18 districts in Beijing. Huairou, Chaoyang, Shunyi, Fengtai,
Fangshan, Pinggu, Shijingshan, and Miyun have issued receipts with lottery
transactions since August 1, 2002. The other ten districts began issuing
11This may also be because the planned sale of lottery x* was not realized.
12See ‘People’s Daily’, July 31, 2002 for details.
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receipts on October 1, 2002. Therefore, the effect of the experiment on tax
revenues can be estimated by district-level panel data (18 districts, 6 years,
before and after the experiments).
One district of Tianjin, Tanggu has issued the receipt with lottery since
January 1, 2003. The other districts of Tianjin have issued receipts with
lottery purchases only since 2004. Tianjin is adjacent to Beijing both geo-
graphically and culturally. They are both cities under the direct control of
the central government. According to Table 1, the populations, city scale,
and income of these two cities are very similar. Therefore, we used Tianjin as
a control area for a comparative analysis of before and after the experiments
in Beijing.
4.2 The Data Set
We obtained detailed information on the experiments, such as prize amounts
and tax revenues, from the Tianjin Statistics Bureau, Tianjin Tax Bureau,
Beijing Statistics Bureau, and Beijing Tax Bureau. Beijing Statistics Year-
book 1999-2004, Tianjin Statistics Yearbook 1999-2004, Beijing Public Fi-
nance Statistics Yearbook 2002-2004 and China Statistics Yearbook 1999-
2004 are used. Therefore, we used the 6-year (1998-2003) district-level data
(18 districts in Beijing and 21 districts in Tianjin) to empirically examine
the effect of experiment.
The information on prize reported by mass media or estimated by the
author,13 is shown in Appendix B. In Tanggu of Tianjin, the prize was 75,800
13The author has used the prize reported by mass media to estimate the prize in the
period without reporting by weighted average. The detailed information is available upon
request.
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Yuan in 2003.
The definitions of variables are described in Appendix C. Summary
statistics of the data are reported in Table 2. The main information be-
fore and after the experiments is summarized by district in Table 3. These
two tables provide some indication of the effects of the experiment.
4.3 Empirical Specification and Estimation Method
Following Heckman and Hotz (1989), Papke (1994) and Wooldridge (2002),
we used the following empirical models to capture the effect of the experi-
ments (Equation (5)), and first obtained a random trend model,
yit = ci + βLREit + γZit + git + uit, (6)
where yit is the level value of per capita real business tax revenue in district i,
LREit is the information on experiment, Zit are the controlled variables with
level values, gi is the specific trend in the district, ci is the specific time-
invariant factor, uit is the white noise. ci, gi and uit are all unobserved.
When yit and Zit are log values, Equation (6) becomes a random growth
model.
The first difference of Equation (6) becomes
∆yit = β∆LREit + γ∆Zit + gi +∆uit. (7)
For a consistent estimator of β, the important condition is that the LREit is
exogenous. As pointed out in Heckman and Hotz (1989) and Papke (1994),
15
if there is a problem of self-selection regarding program participation, it is
very hard to obtain a consistent estimator of β. Here, there are three reasons
to bring LRE close to be exogenous. Firstly, there are many preparations
that must be made before the LRE starts. The timing of LRE is mainly
determined by the degree of the preparation. Secondly, as everyone knows,
China is a centralized country, and policy changes cannot occur in a state or
a city unless the central government grants permission; moreover, no state or
city has the freedom to accept or reject central government policy. Thirdly,
because all of the samples used in the econometric analysis are areas that
participated in the experiment, by using experiment information for different
periods we can avoid the problem of serious self-selection and tend to obtain
a consistent estimator of the effect of the experiment. Therefore, it can
reasonably be said that LREit is exogenous to a large degree.
Because error term ∆uit is the one difference of uit, it becomes a series
correlation.14 The fixed effect of panel estimation considering this charac-
teristic of the error term is used to estimate Equation (7). This method
is the fixed effect within regression with AR(1) disturbances explained in
detail in Papke (1994) and Wooldridge (2002).
4.4 Variables used in the Empirical Tests
The methods of making the variables for estimation are summarized in Ap-
pendix C. ∆yit is the one difference of yit which is the level or log value
of per capita real business tax revenue in district i and is the dependent
variable. ∆LREit is the dummy variable for an experiment district (1 for
14Corr(∆uit,∆uit−1) = −0.5. See page 283 of Wooldridge (2002) for details.
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an experiment district, 0 for others) multiplied by the dummy variable for
the experiment time (1 for experiment time, 0 for other time).15
To obtain a difference in difference estimator for β, Huairou in Beijing
and Tanggu in Tianjin are dropped from the sample, because Huairou and
Tanggu have different timing of LRE compared to other districts.16 Thus,
we finally use a data set of 37 districts for 6 years.
5 Estimated Results
Table 4 is the result of panel estimation based on the information for 17
districts in Beijing (excluding Huairo) and 20 districts in Tianjin (excluding
Tanggu). The dependent variables are the first differences of the level and
the logarithm of business tax and total tax revenues, and the independent
variables are the first differences of LRE, GDP, GDP of the 2nd sector and
GDP of the 3rd sector; thus the value of the estimated coefficient of ∆LRE
serves as the difference in the level between experiment and non-experiment
areas. For business tax revenue, the coeffiects of ∆LRE are significant,
ranged from 84.355-105.676, and the elasticities of experiment is from 0.171
to 0.213. In the case of total tax revenue, the effect of the experiment is not
significant, although the coefficient is positive. These results imply that the
experiment has significantly raised business tax revenue by over 17.1 percent
15∆LREit is the independent variable. ∆Prizeit is the one difference of per capita real
lottery prize; it is considered a proxy for capturing the experiment effect (∆LREit) and
is an independent variable.
16The estimation results are almost unchanged when Huairou and Tanggu are included
in the sample, and these results are also available upon request.
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but has no significant effect on total tax revenue.17
Table 5 shows the results of panel estimation based on the information
for the 17 districts in Beijing and 20 districts in Tianjin. The dependent
variables are the first differences of logarithm of business tax revenues and
total tax revenues, and the independent variables are the first differences
of LRE, logarithm of GDP, GDP of the 2nd sector and GDP of the 3rd
sector; thus the value of the estimated coefficient of ∆LRE serves as the
difference in the growth rates between experiment and non-experiment areas.
For business tax revenues, there was about a significant 21.5-24.2 percent
increase in the growth rates of the experiment areas. In the case of total
tax revenue, there was a 10.4-11.6 percent increase.18
6 Conclusion
The literature on tax evasion has been focused on the effects of governmental
monitoring, punishment and consumer’s attributes on the tax evaders. It is
the first time that the LRE in China has been tried to give the taxpayers’
incentive to voluntarily declare the tax base by not inflicting punishment
but giving a prize (public lottery) simultaneously.
This paper examined, theoretically and empirically, the effect of LRE on
17The author also has used the first difference of prize as a proxy for ∆LRE, but he has
not obtained significant effect from prize. There may be two reasons. First, the amount
of prize is determined by the sales simultaneously thus it is endogenous. Second, the data
on prize is not statistical data but estimated by the author, thus there would be large
measurement error on the prize data. These estimation results are also avalaible upon
request.
18The author also has used the first difference of prize as a proxy for ∆LRE , but has
not obtained significant effect from prize. Same reasons as in Footnote 17 are considered.
These results are also avalaible upon request.
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tax revenues (implicitly on tax evasion) in China. When the revenue from
the public lottery printed on an official receipt is used to finance the public
good, even if a consumer has expected utility with quasi-linear preference,
he or she will purchase a lottery receipt. By issuing lottery receipt, the Chi-
nese government can prevent the tax evasion caused by collusion between
consumers and firms and can collect business taxes effectively to some ex-
tent. Our empirical examination of 6-year data from 37 districts in Beijing
and Tianjin indicated that business tax revenue was significantly (over 17.1
percent) higher, and the real growth rates of business tax and total tax rev-
enues were significantly (over 21.5 and over 10.4 percent, respectively) higher
in experiment areas than in non-experiment areas. Moreover, because the
data sets used were from all of areas that participated in the experiments,
and because the estimations were based on different periods of participation,
self-selection problems were avoided to a large degree. Thus, our analysis is
similar to a kind of (quasi) natural experiment.
The Chinese economy in the 20th century was quite experimental; for
example, there was the socialist economy experiment, the market economy
experiment, and the experiment with lottery receipts. By means of these
experiments, the Chinese economy has both stagnated and grown. Although
it is natural that some experiments will fail to an extent, it is obviously
necessary to avoid failure if possible. Through the analysis of the data sets
conducted in this study, the LRE can be judged as successful insofar as
it increased business tax revenues and the growths of business and total
tax revenues. Certainly, this new system of taxation will have a significant
influence on future tax collection policies in China, and perhaps in other
19
countries as well.
In future research, we must clarify theoretically and more specifically
consumer preference for lottery ticket purchases and empirically apply those
data to the information from the experiment and non-experiment areas for
2004. Moreover, we must obtain nationwide information and perform de-
tailed analyses based on individual data, including attitudes toward the
lottery receipt system.19 Additionally, because playing the lottery is a form
of gambling, we must consider the social cost of gambling in relation to
social welfare.20
19Aanlysis based on individual data has been a research project of Center of Excellence
program in Osaka University. The first survey on 1,500 Chinese households was performed
in March 2006. The author is making econometric analysis using this micro data set.
20However, the tax evasion is penalized in every country when it is dectected by gov-
ernment, thus the tax evasion is also a form of gambling.
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Figure 2: The Delivery of the Receipt with Lottery in China 
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Table 1: Main Indicators in Beijing and Tianjin 
in 2002 
 
 
?  ?  ?  
2002 Beijing Tianjin 
Population 14.253 million 9.191 million 
GDP 321270 million Yuan 205120 million Yuan 
Per capita GDP 22541 Yuan 22380 Yuan 
Growth rate of per capita GDP 0.08 0.11 
Total tax revenues 53400 million Yuan 37590 million Yuan 
   
Source? Beijing Statistics Yearbook 2003, Tianjin Statistics Yearbook 2003 
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 (author's search using the search engine Google.com in May 2003)
number of districts
or cities
number of districts
(cities) with lottery
receipt experiment
the rate of lottery
receipt experiment
(percent)
Nationalwide 2858 228 7.98
Beijing 18 18 100
Tianjin 18 0 0
Hebei 172 16 9.3
Shanxi 119 0 0
Neimenggu 101 0 0
Liaoning 100 28 28
Jiling 60 5 8.33
Heilongjiang 130 11 8.46
Shanghai 20 20 100
Jiangshu 108 0 0
Zhejiang 88 0 0
Anhui 106 4 3.77
Fujian 84 13 15.48
Jiangxi 99 18 18.18
Shandong 139 25 17.99
Henan 158 7 4.43
Huben 101 13 12.87
Hunan 122 9 7.38
Guangdong 122 26 21.31
Guangxi 110 0 0
Hainan 20 3 15
Congqing 40 1 2.5
Sichuan 180 0 0
Guizho 86 5 5.81
Yunan 128 4 3.13
Xizhuang 73 0 0
Sanxi 107 0 0
Ganshu 86 5 5.81
Qinghai 43 0 0
Ningxia 24 0 0
Xinjiang 96 0 0
Note: It is from author's search using the search engine Google.com in May 2003.
It is not statistical data, some notes are needed.
Appendix A: The Areas with Lottery Receipt
Experiment (LRE) in China in 2002
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